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Recent research in contract theory on the effects of
behavioral biases implicitly assumes that they are
stable, in the sense of not being affected by the con-
tracts themselves. In this paper, we provide evidence
that this is not necessarily the case. We show that in
an insurance context, being insured against losses
that may be incurred in a real‐effort task changes
subjects' self‐confidence. Our novel experimental
design allows us to disentangle selection into in-
surance from the effects of being insured by ran-
domly assigning coverage after subjects revealed
whether they want to be insured or not. We find that
uninsured subjects are underconfident while those
that obtain insurance have well‐calibrated beliefs.
Our results suggest that there might be another me-
chanism through which insurance affects behavior
than just moral hazard.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Self‐assessments and beliefs matter in decision making and contract design. Optimal decisions
depend on correct self‐assessments and beliefs that are not systematically biased. One important
example is self‐confidence in own ability and performance. In particular, overconfidence has
been established as a relevant aspect in individual's economic behavior. For example, over-
confidence has been found to predict excess market entry of entrepreneurs (Camerer & Lovallo,
1999), risky investment decisions of CEOs (Malmendier & Tate, 2005), and speculative trading
(Scheinkman & Xiong, 2003). In the context of insurance, Sandroni and Squintani (2007)
consider the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model in the presence of overconfident individuals.
They find that if the share of overconfident types in the population is large enough, compulsory
insurance is not Pareto‐optimal anymore. It follows that overconfidence as a behavioral in-
clination has important implications for contract design in several settings (see e.g., De la
Rosa, 2011; Santos‐Pinto, 2008; Sautmann, 2013).
While the majority of papers focuses on the case of overconfidence, situations in which
individuals are underconfident are also researched (Benoît, Dubra, & Moore, 2015; Clark &
Friesen, 2009; De la Rosa, 2011; Hoelzl & Rustichini, 2005; Moore & Cain, 2007; Sandroni &
Squintani, 2007; Sautmann, 2013). Imperfect self‐confidence calibration relates to many effects
observed in human decision making. However, a general interpretation of the literature on self‐
confidence is that over‐ or underconfidence are comparably stable traits, at least within a
certain decision environment. That is, one can be overconfident when driving and under-
confident with math tasks, but overconfidence when driving should not be affected by the color
of the car that one drives.
This paper provides evidence for self‐confidence to be malleable in a setting that has re-
levant implications. Our focus here is on over‐ and underplacement as a specific form of over‐/
underconfidence. Larrick, Burson, and Soll (2007) define the degree of an individual's over-
placement as the difference between her perceived and actual percentile in the distribution of
performance within a group. It differs from other concepts of overconfidence in that it depends
on the expected performance of others. We show in a laboratory experiment that self‐placement
depends on whether people acquire insurance or not. While insurance in our setup partially
covers potential losses from bad performance in a real‐effort task, it should be unrelated to self‐
placement for rational decision makers. At the same time, we find no evidence for more
overconfident individuals choosing more or less insurance in the first place.
More specifically, we implement an experimental design that allows us to disentangle effects
from the incentives provided by the insurance contract from effects coming from selection into
the contract. In the insurance context, the former is known as the problem of moral hazard and
the latter as the problem of adverse selection.
Before attempting the real‐effort task, individuals are given the choice to buy the insurance
contract. Conditional on this choice, actual insurance status is randomized, that is, whether one
obtains insurance or not is based on a random draw, and individuals are informed about their
insurance status throughout the experiment. Our design is similar to the one used in a credit
market field experiment by Karlan and Zinman (2009). Their idea is to attract borrowers with
an advertised interest rate and, conditional on showing up in the lenders office, to randomize
the actual interest rate. However, Karlan and Zinman (2009) are not able to impose an interest
rate that is higher than the one advertised, as borrowers could simply walk out of the experi-
ment. In a laboratory experiment, by design there is no attrition. This allows us to assess
whether the effect of insurance on relative self‐assessment only comes from feeling (un‐)lucky
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when actually (not) receiving it—remember, insurance status is based on a random draw—or
whether there is another mechanism that is consistent with the effect. A related design is used
by Bó, Foster, and Putterman (2010), who let individuals vote on a policy that allows punish-
ment for defection in a prisoners dilemma, but then randomize the actual implementation of
the policy (see also Sutter, Haigner, & Kocher, 2010).
Our real‐effort task involves the forecasting of numbers with the help of two cue values
(Brown, 1998; So, Brown, Chaudhuri, Ryvkin, & Cameron, 2017; Vandegrift & Brown, 2003).
This task fulfills two requirements for our purpose of creating a realistic insurance setting. First,
the ability for forecasting, which might in the present case be related to math skills, varies
sufficiently in the sample to create different levels of confidence in own ability. Second, the
participant's effort can influence the precision of their forecasts and thus their relative per-
formance. Schram and Sonnemans (2011) also consider insurance choice by varying various
parameters such as the number of available contracts. However, in their setting, losses occur
without a subject's influence, which may not be realistic for some insurance contracts such as
car insurance. Previous experiments studied insurance choice with exogenous loss in various
settings, see for example Ganderton, Brookshire, McKee, Stewart, and Thurston (2000) and
Laury, McInnes, and Swarthout (2009). Our design naturally exhibits features of insurance
markets outside the laboratory such as adverse selection and moral hazard, but of course it has
to abstract from some features of real‐world insurance markets.
Self‐placement is measured as the difference in an individual's self‐assessed and true per-
formance rank among all participants within an experimental session, regardless of whether
they had insurance or not. The elicitation of the self‐assessed rank is incentivized by rewarding
accuracy. We find that, on average, insured individuals have well‐calibrated beliefs about their
ability relative to others, while those individuals that do not have insurance underplace
themselves. These results are in line with experiments by Clark and Friesen (2009) and Murad,
Sefton, and Starmer (2016), who argue that the use of real‐effort tasks and incentivized con-
fidence elicitation leads to a lack of overconfidence which is generally observed in “better‐than‐
average” predictions. Moore and Cain (2007) and Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) find that
subjects tend to underplace themselves in tasks that are perceived as difficult and where
performance is low in absolute terms, which is also true for our setup. Meub and Proeger (2015)
study socially derived anchors, and they show that the social context increases biased behavior.
There is a second interpretation of our results that is also possible.1 Participants could be
unaware of or have miscalibrated beliefs regarding the effect of insurance on their relative
performance. More precisely, this could be relatively miscalibrated beliefs about own moral
hazard or miscalibrated beliefs about the performance of others without insurance. While we
have no way of formally disentangling the two possibilities, given the relative measure of
confidence, the specifics of our setup tend to favor the miscalibration of beliefs about own moral
hazard when being insured.
The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, we show that individuals' self‐confidence
can be affected by contracts. While in its generality, this result is probably not too surprising, its
impact on our insurance application bears relevant implications—just imagine that drivers
become relatively more overconfident after being insured. While contract design has started to
take behavioral biases into account (Kőszegi, 2014), we are not aware of any existing model that
would be consistent with our main finding. Second, we experimentally study assumptions made
1We are very grateful to the editor for pointing out this interpretation.
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on the selection mechanism into contracts based on presumably stable traits such as self‐
confidence calibration (see e.g., Sandroni & Squintani, 2007, 2013). This paper thus speaks to a
broader literature that studies sorting into contracts based on behavioral biases and preferences
(Dohmen & Falk, 2011; Larkin & Leider, 2012). Finally, we add experimental evidence to
decision making in a behavioral insurance context in which own effort instead of a random
device determines losses to a significant extent (Browne, Knoller, & Richter, 2015), and we
think that thus our contribution is also methodological.
2 | EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment was conducted at MELESSA, the economics laboratory of the University of
Munich. It was computerized with the help of z‐tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and participants were
invited with the organizational software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
Monetary payoff was based on points, converted to euros at a fixed and pre‐announced
exchange rate. Participants received an endowment of 100 points, equal to EUR 10. The show‐
up fee for participants was an additional EUR 4.
The experiment consisted of three parts, and participants were aware of this from the start of
the experiment. They were not informed about the content of the next part before the end of the
previous part. In this paper, we analyze only the data from Part I of the experiment.2 Experi-
mental instructions for all parts are provided in the Supporting Information Appendix B.
In the following, we first explain the experimental procedure of Part I. We then discuss three
features of the experimental design in more detail: belief elicitation, the real‐effort task, and the
insurance decision.
2.1 | Experimental procedure
Part I of the experiment consisted of seven stages that are illustrated in Figure 1, along with the
variables that were generated at each stage. Screenshots of the key Stages 2–6 can be found in
the Supporting Information Appendix C.
In Stage 1, subjects received a sheet of paper with 10 examples of solutions in the real‐effort
task (see the section on the details of the task below). The real‐effort task was a forecasting task,
and the examples could be studied for 5min. A pen was provided, and participants were
allowed to take notes, which was actually done frequently.
Stage 2 consisted of five practice rounds (five forecasts) with feedback on individual per-
formance. These practice rounds were not incentivized, but there was an implicit incentive in
the form of a potential information gain regarding one's own ability in this task.
In Stage 3, individuals had to decide whether they wanted to buy the insurance for the
upcoming payoff‐relevant rounds or not. The insurance covered 65% of losses in the real‐effort
task and came at a cost of 22.5 points. An on‐screen calculator could be used at this point.
In Stage 4, actual insurance receipt was randomized, and the choice made in Stage 3 was
realized with 70% probability. Thus, if a subject did not want to buy insurance, there was still a
2Part II consisted of a set of lottery decisions; Part III was a short survey on subjects' experience with insurance. The
payoffs reported here are only those that subjects achieved in Part I. Subjects' total earnings from the experiment were
the sum of the payoffs in Parts I and II, while the questionnaire in Part III was not incentivized.
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30% probability that she got the insurance and that she had to pay the premium. Conversely,
there was an equally large chance to not receive insurance, although the subject wanted to buy
it. This creates a 2 × 2 matrix of possible outcomes shown in Table 1. The probability of 70% was
chosen trading‐off incentive‐compatibility and statistical power. A message informed partici-
pants about the realized insurance status.
Stage 5 comprised the 10 rounds of the real‐effort forecasting task. The message showing the
realized insurance status stayed on the screen throughout this stage.
After the 10 rounds of the real‐effort task were completed, we elicited self‐assessed per-
formance in Stage 6. Individuals were asked to think about their average performance in the
previous 10 rounds and should indicate which rank they think that they hold in their respective
session, consisting either of 23 (one session) or of 24 (six sessions) participants. The person with
the lowest average forecasting error would take the first rank, the one with the second‐lowest
the second rank, and so on. At this point, subjects had not received any feedback on their or
other participants' performance. Guessing the rank correctly earned 10 additional points, and a
deviation of ±1 from the realized rank earned 5 additional points.
Between Stages 6 and 7, the second part and the third part of the experiment took place. In
Stage 7, one of the 10 real‐effort task rounds was randomly drawn by the computer to be payoff‐
relevant, and subjects were informed about their performance and earnings in this round. They
also learned how much they earned from the ranking guess. At the end of the experiment,
individuals answered a standard demographic questionnaire and were paid out in private.
All stages were known in advance and common knowledge among participants, with the
exception of Stage 6. This is a key feature of the experiment: So as not to influence the insurance
choice and performance in the earlier stages, we announced that we elicit subjects' assessment
of their own relative performance (Stage 6) only after the insurance decisions and the real‐effort
task had been completed in the earlier stages.
FIGURE 1 Experimental procedure and definition of variables
TABLE 1 Sample distribution
Actual
Insurance status Yes No Total
Yes 68 41 109
Choice 41% 25%
No 13 45 58
8% 27%
Total 81 86 167
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2.2 | Remarks on belief elicitation
There are several aspects of the elicitation that warrant a short discussion. We chose to measure
confidence in performance after the task, instead of before the task, to avoid hedging behavior and
possible priming or goal‐setting effects. Asking individuals about their relative performance to
others before the task could give the wrong impression of a competitive environment, which we
neither consider in this paper, nor is it common in an insurance context outside the laboratory.
We are well aware of the fact that linear incentives when eliciting beliefs have their lim-
itations (see, Gächter & Renner, 2010; Trautmann & van de Kuilen, 2015). Obviously, a linear
scoring rule is not a proper scoring rule, but even proper scoring rules do not account, for
instance, for respondents risk attitudes that might matter in this context. Offerman, Sonne-
mans, Van de Kuilen, and Wakker (2009) discuss potential adjustments for risk attitudes and
for non‐expected utility models. Nonetheless, it is important to notice that approximately risk‐
neutral respondents have an incentive to report the event they think is most likely to occur
under a linear scoring rule (see Schlag, Tremewan, & Van der Weele, 2015). Hence, under mild
assumptions, our measure of confidence should not be systematically biased, on average,
compared to a quadratic scoring rule.
Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence in experimental economics that provide a
comparison between different elicitation methods regarding beliefs. Thus, all forms of elicita-
tion exist in experimental economics papers: unincentivized elicitations, linearly incentivized
elicitations, elicitations based on quadratic scoring rules, and elicitations based on quadratic
scoring rules with adjustments for risk attitudes. In other words, the trade‐off between
straightforward implementation (easy to explain, easy to understand) and desirable theoretical
properties (full incentive compatibility) has not been solved by the profession. Schlag et al.
(2015) provide an extensive discussion on belief elicitation. They conclude that “given the
limited time and resources that we can invest in belief elicitation, simple mechanisms that yield
more imprecise information, […], may be preferable to more complicated ones that yield very
precise beliefs” (p. 485). However, they also argue that it depends on the context, on the
participant pool, and on the research questions at hand when one wants to determine the
behaviorally optimal scoring rule. They continue in stating that more empirical research is
needed that compares different scoring rules in action to determine behaviorally proper ones.
2.3 | More information on the real‐effort task
We used the forecasting task by Brown (1998), Vandegrift and Brown (2003), and So et al.
(2017). Participants are asked to enter the price Y of a fictitious stock whose price they had to
predict from two cue valuesW1 andW2. The true relationship ofY and the two cues was given by
Y W W e= 50 + 0.3 + 0.7 + ,1 2 (1)
where W W U, ~ (0, 250)1 2 and e N~ (0, 5). Y was rounded to the nearest integer. Individuals
knew that there was a potential constant, but did neither know that the function was linear,
that the weights added to one, nor that there was a random error term e. During the task,
individuals where shown W1 and W2 on the screen and had 60 s every round to enter their
forecast Ŷ into a box and click OK (see Figure C.4 in the Supporting Information Appendix).
The remaining time was always displayed on screen. Individuals could not earn more points by
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entering an answer faster than in 60 s, but after 60 s without any input, the program would skip
to the next round, automatically creating a no‐input. We introduced a penalty to avoid this, and
the details are described in the next section. From the forecasting input we derived the error in
each forecast, which is given by the absolute difference between the true and the predicted
value of Y :
Y YError = | − ˆ |. (2)
2.4 | Insurance
Based on a pilot of the real‐effort task, we set the insurance premium to 22.5 points, with a
coverage rate of 65%. Remember that only one round was payoff‐relevant, that is, the insurance
was valid for all rounds. Earnings from the task are
Earnings = 100 − errorno (3)
for individuals that did not get the insurance and
Earnings = 100 − error × (1 − 0.65) − 22.5in (4)
for those that did. Thus, insurance covered 65% of the loss from the absolute difference between
the true and the predicted value of Y . Notice that we capped losses at the zero earnings
boundary. As a consequence, there were no losses from this part of the experiment unless a
participant had not entered any forecast at all for the randomly chosen round and was insured.
In that case, the participant would have to pay the insurance premium of 22.5 points from her
show‐up fee. This happened only once.
2.5 | Experimental participants
We conducted seven sessions in the MELESSA laboratory at the University of Munich. Six
sessions involved 24 participants and one session 23 participants. In total, 167 subjects parti-
cipated and earned on average EUR 12.50 in a bit more than 1 hr. Participants were mainly
students from various backgrounds, with 33% studying economics or business, 18% life sciences
or engineering and 13% humanities. Almost 60% of participants were female, and age ranged
from 18 to 43, with an average of 22.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Descriptive results on self‐placement and insurance choice
We first look at a set of descriptive results. Our variable of interest is rankdiff, the difference
between the individual's actual and guessed ranks as entered in Stage 6 of the experiment:
Rankdiff = TrueRank − GuessedRank. (5)
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A positive value indicates overplacement, where higher values imply stronger overplacement.
A similar variable has been applied by Sautmann (2013), who uses the difference between
predicted and actual scores in trivia quizzes as her measure for overconfidence. The mean of
rankdiff in our study is −1.37 (which is significantly different from zero at the 5% level),
indicating slight underplacement, on average. The distribution of rankdiff is shown in Figure 2.3
The average underconfidence result is in line with Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) and their task‐
specific explanation. However, there exists considerable variation of rankdiff in our sample on
the individual level and when comparing treatments. An alternative measure is a simple in-
dicator variable for overconfidence. It takes on the value one if rankdiff is larger than zero, and
the value zero otherwise. The entire sample has a share of 38.32% overconfident individuals
according to this measure.
Remember that we can distinguish between four insurance outcomes, indicated by the
variables HasInsurance and WantsInsurance. The variable HasInsurance describes the true in-
surance status of an individual in the real‐effort task, and it is randomized. The variable
WantsInsurance describes the individual's initial choice for or against insurance, and it is
endogenous in the sense that it may correlate with any observed or unobserved individual
characteristics such as gender, age, and risk attitude. Conditional on insurance choice
(=WantsInsurance), HasInsurance identifies the incentive effects of the insurance contract.
Conditional on actual insurance status (=HasInsurance), WantsInsurance identifies selection
effects, that is, differences between individuals who wanted insurance and those who did not.
Table 2 displays means and standard deviations of rankdiff by insurance outcome. Table A.1
in the Supporting Information Appendix contains p values of t tests within every cell of Table 2
whether the mean of rankdiff is significantly different from zero. In addition, Supporting In-
formation Table A.2 displays p values of pairwise, two‐sided Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney tests for
differences in rankdiff between all experimental groups. We observe strong and highly sig-
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difference between true and guessed rank
Overconfidence FIGURE 2 Distribution of
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can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
3The distribution of rankdiff by insurance choice and actual insurance status is shown in the Supporting Information
Appendix Figure A.2.
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for those who did not want insurance, when we pool observations for those who ended up with
insurance and those who did not.
Two‐thirds (109 of 167) of individuals wanted to buy the insurance. We can investigate
which individual characteristics predicted insurance choice. Table 3 shows mean values of
these variables by insurance choice status and in the full sample. Individuals who made larger
errors in the practice rounds were more likely to prefer insurance, which is in line with
standard predictions of adverse selection models. Insurance pays off is a dummy equal to one if
the forecasting error in a practice round was larger than 22.5/0.65 = 34.62, which is the break‐
even point (error) of the insurance for a fully rational risk‐neutral decision maker. There is a
large difference of 20 percentage points between those who wanted insurance and those who
did not. However, buying insurance would still have paid off in 40% of rounds for those that did
not want to buy insurance. On average, in 53% of the practice rounds insurance would have
paid off. This is a feature that does not necessarily show up in settings outside the laboratory in
which insurance is often used in a trade‐off between reducing risk and lowering expected
payoff. However, there is considerable heterogeneity across individuals in this respect in our
data. Females more frequently wanted insurance than males and so did younger individuals.
3.2 | Regression analysis
We now turn to the effect of insurance on self‐confidence and selection into insurance based on self‐
confidence by using parametric models. All regressions in Table 4 use ordinary least squares esti-
mations and include session fixed effects.4 We start with performance in the real‐effort task in the first
column.We find that having the insurance increases the absolute forecasting error by 4 points (or 0.15
standard deviations). The same difference is found between individuals who wanted and not wanted
insurance. The first effect is moral hazard and the second adverse selection, two classic elements in
insurance markets (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976; Shavell, 1979). Column 2 shows the direct con-
sequence of a lower performance in the task: both incentive and selection effects lead to a higher (i.e.,
worse) ranking within a session. Column 3 concerns the rank that individuals guessed they are
taking. Individuals who ultimately got the insurance do not rank themselves worse or better than
those who did not. In contrast, the pure selection effect in guessed ranks equals the one in true ranks.
It follows in column 4 that insurance increases the difference between individual's guessed and actual
TABLE 2 Mean and standard deviation of rankdiff
WantsInsurance = 1 WantsInsurance = 0 Total
HasInsurance = 1 0.088 −0.46 −2.01
(7.39) (6.00) (7.67)
HasInsurance = 0 −2.88 −2.46 −1.03
(6.99) (7.96) (7.41)
Total −2.66 0.00 −1.37
(7.56) (7.23) (7.50)
4Ordered logit (for rank outcomes) and logit (for the overconfident dummy) models yield very similar results. The
results are available on request.
GUBER ET AL. | 437
rank by 2.96 ranks. Conditional on actual receipt, there exists no significant difference in self‐
confidence between those subjects that wanted and did not want the insurance. This is in contrast to
Sandroni and Squintani (2007), who assume that overconfident individuals are less likely to buy
insurance, because they perceive their risk to be lower than is actually the case. We find that, on
TABLE 3 Insurance choice
Did not want insurance Wanted insurance Total
Error in practice rounds 41.52 57.81*** 52.15
Insurance pays off 0.40 0.60*** 0.53
Female 0.36 0.67*** 0.56
Age 23.33 21.42*** 22.08
Note: Insurance pays off is a dummy equal to one if the forecasting error in a practice round was larger then 22.5/0.65 = 34.62,
which is the break‐even point (error) of the insurance for a fully rational risk‐neutral decision maker. *, **, and *** indicate mean
differences are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors clustered at individual level in rows 1 and 2.
TABLE 4 Insurance and overconfidence








HasInsurance 4.088** 2.311** −0.649 2.960** 2.443 3.157** 0.240*** 0.251***
(1.729) (1.147) (0.872) (1.235) (2.137) (1.254) (0.082) (0.083)
WantsInsurance 4.032*** 3.081*** 3.303*** −0.222 −0.473 0.925 −0.016 0.042







Constant 18.171*** 9.368*** 11.341*** −1.974 −1.943 −11.268** 0.296** −0.475*
(2.407) (1.730) (1.118) (2.174) (2.187) (4.793) (0.114) (0.263)
Session f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,670 167 167 167 167 167 167 167
Adj. R2 0.017 0.056 0.053 0.000 −0.006 0.028 0.032 0.074
Note: Rankdiff is the difference between the true and guessed rank of performance in the task. Individuals were incentivized to
guess their rank among all participants in their session with respect to their average performance in the 10 payoff‐relevant
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average, individuals anticipate their performance in the task based on their skill level and adjust their
rank accordingly, but independent of the actual insurance status.
In the following, we investigate if other biases specific to the experimental environment
drive our results. One explanation could be that not getting the insurance despite wanting it
leads to what is called “choking,” a sudden decline of concentration and performance when
individuals feel under pressure (Baumeister, 1984). This could lead to a severe underestimation
of own performance, independent of its true level. Conversely, individuals receiving the in-
surance might feel lucky and thus rank themselves better than they actually are. These two
confounding factors imply that the effect of the insurance on self‐confidence should be larger
among those individuals who also wanted it. In our 2 × 2 design, we can test for this possibility.
Column 5 of Table 4 shows that the interaction term between wanting and actually receiving
the insurance is positive, but far from significant. The main effect of the insurance is not
significant anymore, but the point estimate is similar to that in the columns before.5 Column 6
includes gender and age as explanatory variables to check if these explain the nonsignificant
selection effect. Although the coefficient turns positive, it is not statistically significant and only
one‐third of the insurance effect. The negative coefficient of the gender dummy indicates that
females are underconfident compared to males, which is in line with findings from Bannier and
Schwarz (2018) in the domain of financial decisions. However, we found no statistically
significant differences with respect to performance in the task between males and females,
conditional on insurance status.
Columns 7 and 8 replicate columns 4 and 6 with a dummy equal to one if Rankdiff is
positive as outcome variable and we get qualitatively similar results. The occurrence of over-
confidence in ranking is increased by one‐quarter under the insurance contract.
4 | DISCUSSION
One major concern when trying to elicit self‐assessment biases is to detect what Benoît and
Dubra (2011) call apparent overconfidence. If individuals are Bayesian updaters and receive
only a limited number of noisy signals on their performance, they might rationally rank
themselves better than others, while this is interpreted as overconfidence by the researcher.
This is less of a concern in our experiment, as individuals do not receive any signal on their (or
others') performance in the payoff‐relevant rounds. Their ranking should therefore solely be
based on the perceived difficulty of the task over the ten rounds and an idiosyncratic compo-
nent, which on average is the same between those that get and do not get the insurance,
conditional on choice reflecting individual preferences over insurance. Furthermore, Merkle
and Weber (2011) demonstrate that the extent to which apparent overconfidence poses a
problem in the laboratory is limited.
Another concern may be an insurance‐induced change in a potential hedging motive when
confidence levels are elicited. Since insurance reduces the downside risk in the real‐effort task,
the hedging motive in the elicitation loses importance. As a result, insured individuals could
understate their performance less strongly than noninsured. However, this would imply that
the insured place themselves at better ranks than the noninsured, which is not the case, as can
5This could also be due to lack of power, as the main coefficient of HasInsurance now refers to the insurance effect in
the group that did not want the insurance and this group comprises only one‐third of the sample. The insurance effect
in the group that wanted the insurance is still significant at the 10% level.
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be seen in column 3 of Table 4. Another change in placement behavior arises if participants
anticipate the lower performance of others, potentially induced by having insurance. Knowing
that others will perform worse, they can place themselves better in the confidence elicitation.
However, such higher order thinking applies to both treatment groups and should therefore be
averaged out.
5 | CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reported results of a laboratory experiment in which losses from a real‐effort
task could be reduced by purchasing an insurance. After subjects revealed whether they want to
be insured or not, insurance coverage was randomized. This novel design allows us to disen-
tangle selection from incentive effects.
Self‐confidence in the form of self‐placement is measured as the difference between an
individual's true and self‐assessed performance rank. We find that, on average, uninsured
individuals underplace themselves, while those individuals that obtain insurance have well‐
calibrated beliefs about their ability relative to others. Although the previous literature is
concerned about selection, we believe that we are the first to demonstrate that incentives that
should be irrelevant in standard economic models can change self‐confidence ex‐post. More-
over, we find no evidence for selection into insurance based on self‐confidence.
Why does insurance coverage make individuals relatively less underconfident in their ability
than uninsured individuals? One possible explanation suggested by our regression analysis is
that individuals do not anticipate the moral hazard that is introduced by the insurance. Subjects
do however anticipate their skill level and adjust their rank estimate accordingly. Put differ-
ently, the effect of the insurance is not reflected in an adjusted ranking, while the selection
effect is. This relates to the second interpretation of our results mentioned in the introduction.
Another explanation involves the perception of the difficulty of the task. Under insurance, the
task could appear easier, although in fact only the loss that subjects can incur in the real‐effort
task is lowered. As a consequence, underplacement is reduced. One can imagine alternative
psychological explanations: for instance, insurance could let individuals focus more strongly on
potential gains and thus the expected performance could appear more gloomy.
Our results have implications for insurance markets. Take car insurance as an example.
Outside the laboratory, it is next to impossible to distinguish between potential moral hazard
effects and potential self‐confidence effects. If both are present, the optimal policy of the insurer
should take both into account. Remedies against moral hazard would not be enough to mini-
mize unwanted behavioral tendencies when we assume that biased self‐confidence has negative
consequences on driving.
The experiment in this paper also has its limitations. For reasons explained above, we do not
have measures of self‐confidence before randomization of the insurance. Further, we have no
information on whether the induced self‐confidence translates to other tasks and situations
without insurance or on whether it is persistent or not. Ultimately answering this puzzle will
require further research on why individuals become overconfident in the first place. It would
also be very interesting to vary the attractiveness of the insurance to see whether the effect
persists more generally. In addition, studying the impact of different performance beliefs would
be relevant, for instance by asking for the expected absolute performance, rather than by asking
for the ranking. Moreover, one could exogenously manipulated performance beliefs to study
potential miscalibration. Necessarily, some of the design issues in a laboratory experiment are a
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bit artificial or have to pertain to smaller groups than outside the laboratory. A field experiment
with confidence elicitation outside the laboratory could claim a higher level of external validity
and would be an extremely interesting option for future research.
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